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Magnitudes of Performativity:  
Donald Trump in the Anthropo(s)cene
TEEMU PAAVOLAINEN
ABSTRACT
The article presents the Trump presidency and the human-driven geological epoch of 
the Anthropocene as two arguable extremes among current notions of ‘performativity’: 
(1) a traditionally vertical model based on individual action and antagonism – where 
‘facts’ matter less than ‘making things great’; and (2) the more extended, horizontal hu-
man performance of things like global warming (“All the world’s a stage”). Drawing freely 
on George Lakoff and Timothy Morton, it is argued that these models differ fundamen-
tally in ‘magnitude’: where the one is direct, singular, vertical, and fast, the other is sys-
temic, plural, horizontal, and slow beyond human perception. With Judith Butler and 
Naomi Klein, it is also argued that to actually confront the twin crises at issue, we need 
to acknowledge the kind of ‘plural performativity’ – of repetition, norms, and dissimula-
tion – that brought them into being in the first place.
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Magnitudes of Performativity:  
Donald Trump in the Anthropo(s)cene
INTRODUCTION
In a text first formulated in 1982, Richard Schechner identifies seven “magnitudes 
of performance,” from brain event to public macrodrama, with ‘performativity’ as 
the general condition that permeates them all.1 In another text roughly dated to 
335 BCE, Aristotle defines the appropriate magnitude (megethos) of tragedy as 
one that “can readily be taken in at one view,” likening the perception of plot to 
that of a “beautiful” animal (Poetics VII).2 In his first major interview as President 
of the United States, Donald Trump admits to being “periodically hit” by the sheer 
magnitude of his job: “And it is a tremendous magnitude. […] The bigness also 
hits because the – the size of it.”3 (Admittedly he gets the word from the interview-
er, preferring the likes of yuge himself.) The same year he was elected, finally, 
a formal proposal was presented for the beginning of a new geological epoch 
after some 12,000 years of ‘Holocene’ stability: ‘the Anthropocene,’ so named be-
cause of accelerating “human changes to the Earth system” that are “exponential 
in rate and globally significant in magnitude.”4
Proposing to discuss Trump and the Anthropocene side by side in terms of 
performative ‘magnitude,’ this article is not principally in the business of just ex-
tending Schechner’s early tabulation of what is or could count as ‘performance.’ 
Instead, the cases present two arguable extremes among current notions of 
performativity, in the causal sense of bringing about some significant change in 
the world: a traditionally vertical model based on individual action and antago-
1 Schechner 2003, 326.
2 Cited in Belfiore 2001, 48.
3 Blake 2017.
4 IGBP, n.d.; while the idea is much older (see Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016), some basic 
details of Anthropocene science are well summarized on this small website.
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nism, and the more extended, horizontal human performance of things like global 
warming. Whether termed performance or not, we have here two conflicting no-
tions of human action that may respectively be defined as direct and systemic, 
singular and plural, fast and slow. Where the one sets the entrepreneurial individ-
ual against a world reduced to resource, and does much of its work in the tiniest 
attention span of ‘things done’ – fired! signed! tweeted! – the sheer devastating 
magnitude of the other – potentially with a sixth mass extinction – escapes both 
human perception and human concepts of agency, yet cannot but count as the 
ultimate human performance: yes, indeed, “All the world’s a stage.”
However, it is consequential that the operative term of the article is performa-
tivity, even as I also refer to action, causation, or performance in passing.5 To 
give a snapshot definition, extending from Judith Butler’s work on gender, to be 
‘performative’ is to have normative effects that are humanly produced rather than 
‘natural’ – this is the very definition of anthropogenic climate change – yet which 
appear essentially natural to the extent that they conceal the socially iterative 
processes of their production.6
While this dense, fourfold dynamic of repetition, norms, appearance, and dis-
simulation is something to be followed as the article proceeds, I argue that its very 
plurality is by far preferable to the dominant individualistic model of performance 
that Trump so well serves to caricature. For reference, this latter dynamic can 
be exemplified by  two studies  in particular: one  is Jon McKenzie’s well-known 
analysis  of  ‘organizational  efficiency,’  three  years  before  The Apprentice, its 
key ‘challenge’ articulated in the slogan, “Perform – or else: you’re fired!”7 In his 
Cambridge Introduction to Performance Theory (2016), second, Simon Shepherd 
makes the case that the study of performance, in general, and Schechner-style 
Performance Studies, specifically, have not simply emerged within a culture of 
neoliberal capitalism, but may unwittingly facilitate some of its core assumptions: 
both are fiercely opposed  to varieties  “material and  ideological determination,” 
discipline and regulation (“whether by text or craft or tradition”), in favour of indi-
vidual expression and “a fantasy of autonomous agency.”8
On this basis, the superficial morale of this article would be that we need to 
shift our concepts of agency and performativity to a more ecological or distributed 
direction, if only to keep us from trumping up the importance of our own individual 
performance. However, things turn out to be more complex. Introduced in the 
5 I do admit to letting my larger and more limited terms shade into one another fairly free-
ly – performativity to performance, Anthropocene to global warming – and also, to a spa-
cious use of an inclusive “we” that conceals various differences of privilege.
6 See especially Butler 1993, as cited later in the article. On the further theoretical range of 
performativity, see also Paavolainen 2018; Glass and Rose-Redwood 2014.
7 McKenzie 2001, 5.
8 Shepherd 2016, 218–20.
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following section on Trump, the very framing of this article is heavily influenced 
by the cognitive linguist George Lakoff’s ‘conservative’ and ‘progressive’ models 
of direct and systemic causation 9: applicable fairly directly to Trump and global 
warming, these concepts go some way toward explaining the utter, and utterly 
paralyzing, blindness of these phenomena to one another (the climate does not 
care, but neither does the capitalist). While the penultimate section discusses 
not only the more systemic complexities of the Anthropocene, but also efforts to 
imagine and address it in more ‘direct’ terms, the final section attempts to tackle 
questions of scale and scalability more directly: of the direct and the systemic, of 
performativity as effect and performativity as reiteration. Beginning from certain 
benefits of ‘theatrical’ perception – the synoptic magnitude that Aristotle recom-
mended, and Trump so expertly manipulates – it is argued that to confront the 
twin crises of Trump and the Anthropocene we need to recruit all aspects of the 
kind of ‘plural performativity’ that is only tentatively outlined in this article.
As for my own epistemological horizon, it goes without saying that I am no 
expert in either American politics or Earth systems. If I were Trump, I might say 
that ‘nobody knew [they] could be so complicated’ before I myself took to conduct 
the year or so of research that has gone into the writing of this article. From the 
lesser magnitude of my position as a concerned Finnish performance scholar, 
however, I do take some minor pride in basing most of it on sources he would not 
hesitate to call ‘fake news.’10
HOW TO DO THINGS WITH LIES:  
ON DIRECT ACTION AND DISSIMULATION
The current U.S. President’s environmental record is well known. After years of 
calling global warming a Chinese hoax, he had every mention of it deleted from 
the White House website within minutes of his inauguration in January 2017 and 
moved forward with both the Keystone XL and the Dakota Access oil pipelines 
within a week. With a shifting cast of known denialists and fossil billionaires for 
a cabinet, and also at the helm of his Environmental Protection Agency, Trump 
would withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement, and is prepared to open nearly 
all U.S. coastal waters to offshore drilling – “systematically ticking off every single 
item on the fossil fuel industry’s wish list,” as Naomi Klein puts it,11 all the while 
claiming, characteristically, that his is ‘the cleanest and most environmentally 
friendly country on Earth.’ To lay out the distinctly performative aspects of such 
9 E.g. Lakoff 2006, 111–30.
10 Throughout, I use single quotes for phrases the reader may easily detect with a basic 
keyword search; for the same reason, uncontroversial news facts are cited without refer-
ences.
11 Klein 2017, 73.
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strategies, this section moves from the rhetorical level to the cognitive models of 
causation it arguably legitimizes – the magnitude of direct action – and then to the 
more systemic realities these conceal.
Indeed,  one of  the  first  casualties  of  the Trump administration would  have 
been the representationalist view of language that J. L. Austin also set out to 
challenge in How To Do Things With Words (1962). Where the former has ush-
ered in a ‘post-factual’ regime of ‘alternative facts,’ the latter introduced the no-
tion of performative utterances: those that are not “true or false,” but themselves 
constitute “the doing of an action.” Even in Austin’s scenario, however, the mere 
saying of something will not suffice to “make it so” – as in ‘Make America Great 
Again!’ – but only takes effect in “appropriate circumstances” of authority or leg-
islation.12 As for Trump, the first few days of his presidency showed him showing 
off his newly-acquired circumstances, overturning long-standing policies across 
the board by his daily signing of executive orders – a prime example not only of 
doing things with words, but of showing doing in Schechner’s sense of perform-
ing: “pointing to, underlining, and displaying” it.13
With the critical gender theorist Judith Butler, however, I here define political 
performativity as a “reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produc-
es the effects that it names” – one, moreover, that also “conceals or dissimulates 
the conventions of which it is a repetition.”14 If we deem the presidency a “crown-
ing extension of the Trump brand” as Klein does, then the frontman’s “only job 
is to […] repeat its message”15 – and so indeed he has, well since the campaign 
trail: ‘Win, Win, Win. We’re gonna win so much you’ll get tired of winning.’ Apart 
from Butler and Derrida, the performative force of repetition is acknowledged by 
the cognitive science filtered by George Lakoff:  “The more Trump’s views are 
discussed in the media” – and that means millions of reiterations per rant – “the 
more they are activated and the stronger they get.”16 Moreover, even as he goes 
from “policy to policy in a single sentence […] he is always on topic,” provided you 
“understand what his topic is.”17
For Lakoff, Trump’s single overriding topic is what he calls “Strict Father Moral-
ity,” applied by conservatives in “virtually every issue area”; policy detail matters 
little insofar as it works to strengthen this model “in the brains of [the] audience.”18 
Ever since his Moral Politics  (1996), Lakoff has argued  that since we are first 
‘governed’ in our families, our political worldviews also arise from family-based 
12 Austin 1962, 5, 7, 13ff.
13 Schechner 2006, 28.
14 Butler 1993, 2, 12, my italics; cf. Glass and Rose-Redwood 2014, 7.
15 Klein 2017, 5, 33.
16 Lakoff 2016a.
17 Lakoff 2016b.
18 Lakoff 2016b.
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models of empathy and authority: the Nurturant Parent and the Strict Father. 
Whether or not this grand claim is borne out by actual evidence, the more limited 
variant on the theme of causation bears directly on my very argument in this arti-
cle. In short, Lakoff contends that progressives tend to argue on the basis of sys-
temic causation (social, cultural, economic, or ecological), whilst conservatives 
tend to view causation as direct, based on individual action, duty, and authority 
(father knows best and hence is to be obeyed).19 While most people “have” both 
worldviews, one tends to dominate; and “when the facts don’t fit the frame, the 
frame stays and the facts are ignored.”20
In terms of performance magnitude, “direct causation is the simplest kind: 
There is a single agent who purposely exerts force on something.” Throw a ball, 
flip a light switch – this is performativity in the first-person sense of doing things 
with objects, with the simplest of properties: one agent, one action, free will, no 
intermediaries.21 If “global warming is the granddaddy of all systemic causation 
issues” as Lakoff himself recognizes it to be, it is direct causation that “appears to 
be represented in the grammars of all languages around the world” and remains 
by far the easier to understand.22
And of course, “many of Trump’s policy proposals are framed in terms of di-
rect causation”: shoot the shooter; ban all Muslim immigrants; build a wall to stop 
the Mexican ones.23 If the effects of climate change threaten your golf course (in 
County Clare, Ireland), use your experience in real estate and propose they wall 
it off as well. If a long-term sea-level rise is predicted of a magnitude that would 
erase large metropolitan areas across both American coasts, reduce it to a ‘bubb- 
le’ of ‘the bicoastal elites.’ All in all, there is something shady about things hap-
pening slowly over time; instead, action is best taken in short impulsive bursts. In 
a curious iteration of the metaphysics of presence, the ‘best words’ come in the 
moment, no prompter, just using your ‘brain’ and surfing the stream of impulse. 
While coherence smacks of forethought and hence of scripted calculation, even 
blatant lies will sound authentic if only you speak your mind as a direct flow of 
feeling – which they let you do ‘when you are a star’: for Trump, the decisive shift 
from bankruptcy to celebrity came with The Apprentice (2004–), reducing his 
direct-action performance to its plain caricature, ‘you’re fired!’ Klein derives much 
of Trump’s rhetoric from reality TV and its “spectacle of extreme emotion, conflict, 
and suffering,” its actual reality less important than “the theater.”24
19 E.g. Lakoff 2006, 111–30.
20 Lakoff 2006, 196.
21 Lakoff 2006, 112.
22 Lakoff 2006, 123; Lakoff 2016a.
23 Lakoff 2016a.
24 Klein 2017, 53.
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Within the theatre, importantly, Trump’s direct-action performance comes with 
a decidedly antagonistic dramaturgy of containment, aligned with the so-called 
‘alt-right’ against a variety of externalized threats, and rhetorically against a cor-
rupt elite within: even as he speaks to the mixture of racism, nationalism, mi-
sogyny, and militarism that brought him to power, there is no doubting his real 
alliance lies with wealth.25 In both constellations, however, a good part of his ap-
peal comes from his reactionary performance of what one feminist scholar dubs 
‘petro-masculinity’: be it about sheer capital or lower-middle class insecurities, 
the extraction and consumption of fossil fuels serves to barricade an endangered, 
1950s-style status quo “from the spectre of threatening others, whether pollut-
ants or immigrants or gender deviants.”26 Beyond pretensions of representation, 
the president’s personal rhetoric of ‘fake news’ neatly shifts attention to his own 
performance of – imagine it – being wrongfully silenced.
Altogether, these examples begin to suggest how, on this magnitude of per-
formance as direct action, one conceives of freedom, and ultimately the structure 
of reality itself. This is also where Simon Shepherd’s (2016) concern about the 
potentially neoliberal ontology of ‘performance’ lies: if indeed its only life is “in the 
present,” as Peggy Phelan suggests, then by implication its death lurks in more 
distant attempts at its regulation.27 In the conservative Strict Father morality, for 
sure, “freedom” ultimately means freedom from government; thus the Trump 
administration is also committed to lifting “burdensome” energy regulations and 
“eliminating harmful and unnecessary policies” that have “held back” “hardwork-
ing Americans” “for too long.”28 In projecting its patriarchal values across society, 
“strict father morality comes with the idea of the moral order, with man over na-
ture, people over animals and plants – with the idea that nature is there purely for 
profit, to be exploited, not preserved.”29
Ultimately, such conceptions of freedom and world order are the very pinnacle 
of neoliberalism.30 In this strand of late capitalism, in political writer George Mon-
biot’s helpful overview, “political freedom, universal rights, human equality and 
the distribution of wealth” can all be rejected as intruding on the absolute free-
dom reserved for the rich and powerful – the ‘free market’ performing a natural 
hierarchy of winners and losers, in which the wealth gathered at the top magically 
25 See Foster 2017; on containment, see Paavolainen 2012.
26 Daggett 2018, 34, 44.
27 Shepherd 2016, 195, 220.
28 White House 2017: “An America First Energy Plan,” now discontinued.
29 Lakoff 2006, 122.
30 The term is utterly contested and may connote any and all aspects of the current global-
ized, financialized, corporate, “free trade,” or fundamentalist (i.e. conservative) capitalism. 
For a specifically performative account of neoliberalism, see Glass 2016.
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trickles down to all.31 Hence also the core policies of privatization, deregulation, 
corporate trade deals, and ‘donor class’ tax cuts enabled by cuts to public spend-
ing – repeated the world over, right and left, destabilizing any reasonable basis 
for doing much of anything about global warming.32  And across the board, com-
plex systemic issues are translated into ones of direct action: if we all only seek 
our own profit, profit  for all will be maximized by  ‘the market,’  its metaphorical 
“hand” quite as invisible as concentrations of carbon dioxide.33 Likewise, what-
ever executive orders the president makes a spectacle of signing, they will build 
on anti-regulatory actions already taken by Republicans in Congress.
Hence the ironic performativity of dissimulation: ‘draining the swamp’ as a 
euphemism for what Klein dubs Trump’s “corporate coup”34; ‘big, beautiful Christ-
mas present’ for a tax cut that ultimately only affects the rich; ‘entitlement re-
form’ for the attacks on social security to make up for said tax cut; ‘thoughts and 
prayers’ to cover the lack of any policy responses to repeated school shootings; 
calls for such responses dubbed as untactful ‘politicization’ of said shootings; a 
full history of climate-change denial, from its reality through its politics to its ‘nec-
essarily [being] a bad thing.’35 In sociologist John Bellamy Foster’s analysis, the 
common alignment of Trump and similar phenomena in Europe with “right-wing 
populism” is itself a legitimizing cloak for their distinctly neo-fascist (racist, patriar-
chal, ultra-nationalist, financial-capitalist) policies. Joining the likes of Butler and 
Noam Chomsky, Foster historicizes fascism as “the antonym of liberal democra-
cy within a capitalist society,” only more categorical in its rejection of democracy, 
and as a natural ally of the centre right in times of instability (suffice it to mention 
the Finns Party or the Sweden Democrats, here).36
In sum, even while Trump serves to caricature a magnitude of ‘direct perfor-
mance’ imagination that is utterly powerful, essentializing it to one individual will 
not do; as Klein argues, he is “less an aberration than a logical conclusion” of a 
bipartisan neoliberal ideology, decades in the making, now set to “echo through 
geologic time.” Even if the presidency “were to end tomorrow, the political condi-
tions that produced it, and which are producing replicas around the world, will 
remain to be confronted.”37 From a stronger perspective, focusing only on the 
31 Monbiot 2017, 29–41: 32 cited.
32 Klein 2017, 80–1.
33 Cf. Lakoff 2006, 128–9.
34 Klein 2017, 18.
35 E.g. Oreskes and Conway 2012. ‘Entitlement reform’ is Senator Paul Ryan’s trademark 
euphemism; ‘bad thing’ is cited from the lawyer-to-be-coal-consultant Scott Pruitt, Trump’s 
first head of the EPA (Environmental Protection Agency), which, characteristically, he had 
a history of suing for doing pretty much anything at all.
36 Foster 2017.
37 Klein 2017, 9, 266, 10.
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excesses of neoliberalism is itself a way to dissimulate the systemic problems 
with fossilized capitalism as such.38
THEATRUM MUNDI: PERFORMING ‘NATURES’  
IN THE ANTHROPO(S)CENE
In the geological magnitude of performance that I now turn to discuss, things get 
rather more complex still; as a proposed new ‘epoch’ defined by human interven-
tion, the notion of ‘Anthropocene’ has lately caught the imaginations of scientists 
and more culturally-oriented critics alike (I will return to philosopher Timothy Mor-
ton in due course).39 On this scale, both scene and agent are complicated as 
nature itself can be seen as ‘performed’ – as concept, as category, as discourse, 
as the ‘essence’ undermined by any performative argument – and performed by 
a human kind that only appears as a hypothetical entity beyond any normal sense 
of agency or intention. While the geologists will likely date the Anthropocene from 
the post-1945 ‘Great Acceleration’ of human influence, there are grounds for dat-
ing it from the Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth century, or indeed from the 
spread of agriculture and deforestration thousands of years earlier – and anyway 
it extends beyond any foreseeable future. In a blast of magnitudes, we may zoom 
out from the singular events that deniers cling to – the ‘incidental’ hurricanes and 
the ‘cold days’ that all but disprove ‘warming’ – to a future of climate refugees 
flooding in for real, to use a phrase of Trump’s own.
In accordance with Lakoff’s notion of systemic causation, however, the An-
thropocene exceeds by far its most humanly prominent features like global warm-
ing. As opposed to the direct causation of the previous section, the science here 
is one of nonlinear change and dynamic thresholds that may also affect each 
other chaotically. From an ‘Earth System’ perspective, the Anthropocene has 
been defined in terms of nine ‘planetary boundaries,’ four of which have already 
been passed (including the safe orders of magnitude for biodiversity and climate 
change).40 Likewise, the Great Acceleration out of Holocene conditions is depict-
ed by twenty-four ‘hockey stick’ graphs for both human and Earth System activ-
ity over 250 years – GDP growth, population, energy consumption, atmospheric 
carbon, species extinctions, etc. – each with a sharp upturn from about 1950, like 
a forest of Freytag graphs that only go to crisis.41 Easy as it is to think of climate 
change, say, as an incremental linear process (so and so many degrees, poten-
tially to be solved by mere market reforms), such graphs conceal a complex set 
of ‘feedbacks’ and ‘tipping points,’ which again may permanently amplify one an-
38 See Malm 2016, on the generic dependence of capitalism on fossil fuels.
39 For good overviews, see Lewis and Maslin 2018; Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016.
40 Steffen et al. 2015a.
41 Steffen et al. 2015b.
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other and bring about a ‘regime shift’ in the system – with dire consequences not 
only for human civilization but for the very majority of the biosphere.42
The initial implications for the theme of performativity are twofold. First, the 
new geology of the Anthropocene is a matter not of natural change but of human 
performance, and it is to human detriment if it is not recognized as such, by the 
Trumps of the world. Second, however, this is a ‘performance’ not of humans 
intentionally performing for others, but of reiterated practices that regularly get 
confused with essential nature. Where the former evokes Trump’s sense of di-
rect action, the latter again equals Butler’s more tacit sense of performativity as a 
“reiteration of norms which precede, constrain, and exceed the performer,” much 
as a theatrical script “survives” particular actors but also requires them “in order 
to be actualized and reproduced.”43 While the concept draws on aspects of the 
English word ‘perform’ that are simply not present in its Finnish equivalent, say, it 
seems highly apt, here, in at least three ways.
First, the ‘scripts’ that reproduce global warming only do so by being mas-
sively reiterated over dozens and hundreds of generations slowly spanning the 
globe. From agriculture to automobility, the very magnitude of their reiteration 
also lends them a certain normativity; as they virtually define human conduct and 
being, their performers become blind to what Austin might call their perlocution-
ary or unintended effects. 
Second, their performance cannot be framed as past in any convenient way. 
Rather than being per-formed as a completed process or background – the im-
plication of static nouns like nature or indeed the Anthropocene – their proper 
tense is the present participle. The archive is in the sediments, but the repertoire 
is raging on right now. 
Third, this magnitude of performance is also non-humanly distributed. Zoom-
ing out to all those other things on the scene long before and after ourselves, the 
human species is affected by both the ‘natural’ world and the contingent socio-
political conditions in which its communities make their histories. In perhaps the 
most perceptive historical overview to date, the Anthropocene concept is dis-
sected  into  intertwining developments  in politics, war,  consumption,  reflection, 
economy, capitalism, and resistance.44
In one sense, surely, the Anthropocene is only performed through “the reit-
erative and citational practices by which discourse produces the effects that it 
42 Steffen et al. 2018. A fairly comprehensible example of a ‘tipping cascade’ has to do with 
the ‘albedo effect’ of how Arctic ice normally reflects sunlight: as the ice melts, the un-
covered dark ocean will absorb more heat, causing more melting. If the permafrost melts, 
some predict a ‘methane burp’ equal to all the carbon currently in the atmosphere, which 
would be ‘game over for the planet.’
43 Butler 1993, 234; Butler 1988, 525.
44 Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016.
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names.”45 Much as any research method will perform  realities  rather  than  just 
observing them readymade46, global warming, for example, is enacted differently 
from different perspectives – and those of the climatologist, or the corporation, 
or the political activist, or the discourse analyst, or the meteorologist, or the lo-
cal farmer will all perform diverging aspects of it, rather than one generic entity. 
Hence also the proliferation of alternative nomenclature that has come to ques-
tion the troubled universalism of ‘Anthropocene,’ and the very different grand 
narratives of guilt and redemption each alternative implies: Capitalocene, Tech-
nocene, Homogenocene, and Manthropocene are only some of the contenders 
in what has become a cultural ‘Anthropo(s)cene’47 of discursive authority. In the 
words of Christophe Bonneuil, “the various Anthropocene narratives we tell are 
performative; they preclude or promote some kinds of collective action rather 
than others, and so they make a difference to the becoming of the Earth.”48
And yet – moving now to Morton’s central heuristic – hyperobjects such as 
global warming are not  just “a function of our knowledge,” nor “figments of the 
(human) imagination,” but indeed “real whether or not someone is thinking of 
them.”49 In Morton’s version of object-oriented ontology,  their  ‘objectness’ con-
sists precisely “in their being prior to thinking,” yet they are also distinctly ‘hyper’ 
in their magnitude: “massively distributed in time and space relative to humans,” 
they involve “profoundly different temporalities than the human-scale ones we 
are used to.”50  In a way,  they are  the vengeance of objects,  reduced  to mere 
props at Trump’s magnitude of direct action performance. Much like the ‘ready-
to-hand’ tool, for Martin Heidegger, only becomes ‘present-at-hand’ when broken, 
so hyperobjects, too, “act a little bit like the gigantic boot at the end of the Monty 
Python credits”51: suddenly they are there, in the foreground, but still very much 
withdrawn from human access. For Morton, “the necessary ecological thought” 
is that we contribute to global warming by “performing actions that [are] statisti-
cally meaningless” – and yet, zooming out to “Earth magnitude,” it is clear that 
“humans did it, not jellyfish […] not bacteria, not lemons.”52
At such magnitudes, however, the Anthropocene concept also becomes po-
litically problematic. On the one hand, elevating the undifferentiated ‘human en-
terprise’53 into the sole protagonist of a vast biogeophysical drama is not only a 
triumph of human exceptionalism, but prone to reduce both cause and cure to 
45 Butler 1993, 2.
46 See e.g. Law & Urry 2004.
47 Cf. Castree 2015.
48 Bonneuil 2015, 30.
49 Morton 2013, 2.
50 Morton 2013, 21, 1.
51 Morton 2016, 14, 17.
52 Morton 2016, 19–20, 23–4.
53 E.g. Steffen et al. 2015b; this is a standard term in Anthropocene literature.
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frames of direct action. Here, human history is abridged to parameters of popula-
tion and technology, and the former to an ignorant mass whom a small elite of 
scientists would readily lead to a ‘good anthropocene’ by turning the planet into 
a theatre of large-scale intervention.54 For Naomi Klein, the “superhero narrative” 
of being “saved at the last minute” by big technologies or benevolent billionaires 
constitutes a form of “magical thinking”: why not just suck out the carbon or turn 
down the sun?55 Moreover, as Morton adds, geoengineering is only one aspect of 
what he dubs the ‘efficient’ style of ecological thinking (efficiency as in performa-
tivity): beyond the masculine ‘ecomodernism’ of a Musk or a Schwarzenegger, 
the linear, mechanistic, case-by-case template of direct causation is evident in 
the ubiquitous ecological rhetoric of taps, sinks, and footprints, as well as in all 
attempts to shift blame from systemic dependence on fossil capital to individual 
consumption (with the systemic consequence that we keep consuming).56
On the other hand, deriving a geological epoch from some universal trait of 
the species not only obscures vast asymmetries between historical populations, 
but “blocks off any prospect for change,” as two irreplaceable Swedish critics of 
the concept put it. With the Anthropocene, Malm and Hornborg argue, “climate 
change is denaturalised in one moment – relocated from the sphere of natural 
causes to that of human activities – only to be renaturalised in the next,” as a 
function of human essence.57 In this way, Klein adds, the very performativity of 
“systems that certain humans created, and other humans powerfully resisted, 
[is] completely let off the hook” – capitalism, patriarchy, colonialism58 – but per-
haps, there is a degree of disabling essentialism to such historical time scales 
as well: if it has been building for so long, surely today’s fossil capitalism is not to 
blame? Perhaps, rather than confuse the concept’s real potential with too many 
additional neologisms – contingent and passing in a way it won’t – we might 
just  retain  the Anthropocene  for  the geological epoch, and use something  like 
Anthropo(s)cene to highlight the various theatrics of direct action by which it is 
performed – not as points of origin but as repertoires of repetition: ‘man’ versus 
‘nature,’ farmer and field, colonizer and colonized, capitalism and commons.
For Morton, “massively accelerated agriculture” specifically is the “granddad-
dy hyperobject” that lies behind both industrialization and global warming. Arising 
in the Fertile Crescent, it was “a disaster early on, yet it was repeated across 
Earth” – “eventually requiring steam engines and industry to feed its prolifera-
tion,” and “still plowing ahead.” Here, the very distinction between nature and 
culture results from that of nature and agriculture, “establishing the necessarily 
54 Bonneuil and Fressoz 2016, 79–86.
55 Klein 2014, 255; 256–90.
56 Cf. Morton 2018, 209–15; Daggett 2018, 33–4 (ecomodernism); Malm 2016.
57 Malm and Hornborg 2014, 67, 65.
58 Klein 2016.
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violent and arbitrary difference between itself and what it ‘conquers’ or delimits.”59 
Crucially to his argument, the very concept of nature itself becomes an ideologi-
cal barrier to thinking ecology as interconnection, a passive stage set for direct 
performance at Trump magnitude.
And yet, it only takes its appearance of nature as essence from a massive “re-
iteration of norms which precede, constrain, and exceed [any] performer” as But-
ler argued in the context of gender.60 Importantly for its continuity, this reiteration 
is “geological as well as discursive”: for Morton, it emerges from “an accidental 
collaboration” between Earth systems and human systems, “unconscious, and 
therefore  liable to be repeated and prolonged.” Nature  is only defined as “har-
monious periodic cycling” because the concept coincides with “the geological pe-
riod we call the Holocene, a period marked by stable Earth system fluctuations”: 
“Carbon dioxide fluctuated in a harmonious-seeming cycle for twelve thousand 
years – until it didn’t. We Mesopotamians took this coincidence to be a fact about 
our world and called it Nature.”61 
TOWARD A PLURAL PERFORMATIVITY
To recapitulate, I have discussed the Trump presidency and the Anthropocene 
as two arguably extreme examples of the concept of performativity, in a causal 
sense involving repetition, norms, appearance, and concealment. Where the one 
is direct, singular, vertical, and fast, the other is systemic, plural, horizontal, and 
slow beyond human perception. Where the one imagines ‘agency’ in a more or 
less binary world of things done or denied, whatever agency the other allows only 
emerges from the complex interplay of manifold actants over time, both human 
and nonhuman, itself a hyperobject in the sense of evading human access and 
control. And finally, I have noted how the more systemic range has a way of be-
coming inverted or dissimulated into the normative confines of direct action: how 
the performance of Donald Trump is but the tip of a decades-old neoliberal or 
neo-fascist iceberg, and how the still vaster cultural history of the Anthropocene 
is easily converted into a simplified melodrama of an essential ‘humanity’ acting 
on essential ‘nature’ – what I called the Anthropo(s)cene. Taken to extremes, 
the two conceptions tend to deny each other’s very reality: from a direct-action 
perspective, humans could not possibly have an effect on the climate, and from a 
systemic, post-human perspective, there are no individuals to begin with.
While the very point of addressing issues of this magnitude through ‘performa-
tivity’ is to present them as (humanly) changeable rather than (apocalyptically) 
59 Morton 2016, 37, 53, 42–3. On the science of this ‘early Anthropocene’ proposal, see 
Ruddiman 2005.
60 Butler 1993, 234.
61 Morton 2016, 58.
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determined, we clearly need to take issue with such inversions and their associ-
ated exclusions. Specifically, how are we to make sense of systemic phenomena 
like global warming, ever, if so much of our minding capacity is based on direct 
action and perception? In ecocritic Timothy Clark’s terms, the central dilemma is 
one of ‘scale framing,’ and it is especially acute in the arts, insofar as things like 
global warming “resist representation at the kinds of scale at which most poetry, 
narrative or drama operate.”62 As another, Rob Nixon, elaborates, the effects of 
the Anthropocene are “dispersed across space and time […] low in instant spec-
tacle but high in long-term effects” – a matter of slow violence, utterly distinct from 
the in-your-face norms of direct abuse, yet therefore hard to fathom as violence 
at all.63 Insofar as our very verbs evoke the frame of direct action, and our nouns, 
that of a static background, we need to acknowledge the “transcendental stupid-
ity” of our embodied human scale itself: as Clark notes, we just cannot “describe 
the Earth as a whole and not use terms, concepts and images derived from the 
specific categories of life on its surface (apple, forest, blue dot).”64
To begin to actually address the Anthropo(s)cene, then, it is advisable to set 
not only our facts but our orienting frames to scale first. In this concluding section, 
I only briefly suggest what this entails at three intertwining magnitudes: a plural 
performativity of cognition, perception, and action – or, nodding toward Schech-
ner’s “Magnitudes” essay – of their relatively narrative, theatrical, and performa-
tive aspects.65
(1) The most general narrative level intertwines Schechner’s largest and tiniest 
magnitudes: with cognitive theatre scholars, all talk and action can be understood 
as “performative” in the sense that it “makes things happen in the real world of 
our minds.”66 Such is certainly the case if, with a recent eponymous study by two 
U.S. sociologists, we frame “climate change as social drama” – not in my sense 
of its being performed into being by human societies, but as its representation in 
the public sphere, and specifically as a “competition between two camps for in-
terpretative and political power.”67 While Smith and Howe’s analyses of ethos and 
genre have much to commend them (they praise Al Gore over artistic ambiguity, 
“heroic romanticism” over apocalypse), the very frame of representation compro-
mises the urgency and proximity of the issue. Specifically,  ‘competition’ entails 
the very norm of mediatized capitalism, and the whole tired framework of denial 
and belief, including dated arguments that not all scientists agree, or that specific 
62 Clark 2015, 73–5, 175.
63 Nixon 2011, 10, 2.
64 Clark 2015, 38, 33.
65 From the smallest to the largest, Schechner’s seven ‘magnitudes of performance’ include 
brain event, microbit, bit, sign, scene, drama, and macrodrama (2003, 325–6). Taking 
inspiration from this essay does not imply commitment to its categories.
66 McConachie 2012, 28.
67 Smith and Howe 2015, 37.
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catastrophes cannot be attributed to global warming. In Lakoff’s cognitive terms, 
any frame will only get stronger if negated (his pet examples being “don’t think of 
an elephant!” and Richard Nixon’s “I am not a crook”)68, so any and all arguments 
on climate science not being ‘a hoax’ should just be refused.
And yet at the same time, to make the Anthropocene real beyond its repre-
sentations, we should firmly undo all the exclusions and distanciations its denial 
depends on – the first frame to reiterate being that it is here and now, not specula-
tive or hypothetical. As the environmentalist George Marshall argues, we should 
beware of “framing climate change as a future threat for people far away and, 
especially, as a threat for nonhumans, however cute they might be”69  – the stand-
ard soft-green imagery of melting glaciers or draughts in the tropics. The second 
point is that, as Klein argues the ‘merchants of doubt’ well know, it will change 
everything.70 Specifically,  it  is not merely an ‘environmental’  issue in the sense 
that the word tends to withdraw as mere background for direct action in Trump’s 
sense. Marshall, too, pleads for us to “DROP THE ECO-STUFF, especially polar 
bears, saving the planet, and any other language that stakes out climate change 
as the exclusive cultural domain of environmentalism.”71 No marginal concern for 
a marginal group of hippies, it will embrace us all. 
(2) Then again, such embracing rhetoric, especially if heavily reliant on the 
ethos of the messenger, runs all the familiar risks of sensationalism and conde-
scending moralism, prone to invert the issue, again, to a direct performance of 
his or her character. Perhaps, then, we should avoid the contingency of talk and 
theory altogether, for the directness of embodied perception – embrace our “stu-
pidity,” and accept our human scale as the very baseline from which to extend 
our thought, feeling, and existence? Such is the key tenet of cognitive theories 
of ‘conceptual metaphor’ and ‘conceptual blending,’ as advanced by Lakoff and 
others like the literary scholar Mark Turner.72 Assuming that we habitually make 
sense of abstract realities through more immediate experiences, such as of ob-
ject manipulation or family relations, no wonder that the Anthropocene is readily 
addressed through more direct frames as well, most evidently the meteorite that 
launched the previous mass extinction some 66 million years ago (a complex 
process reduced to a fist-strike event of ‘hit the Earth, kill the dinosaurs’).73
In performance terms, moreover, such ‘human-scale cognition’ is directly sup-
ported by the synoptic magnitude that Aristotle recommended, at the dawn of 
68 E.g. Lakoff 2008, 232–41.
69 Marshall 2014, 231–2.
70 Klein 2014; Oreskes and Conway 2012.
71 Marshall 2014, 237.
72 E.g. Turner 2014.
73 On dinosaurs, see Lewis and Maslin 2018, 74, 76–7; on objects see Paavolainen 2012; 
on family relations, cf. earlier on Lakoff’s Strict Father/Nurturant Parent models.
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the agricultural Anthropocene: just as “physical objects and living organisms […] 
should possess a certain magnitude […] such as can readily be taken in at one 
view,” so tragic plots also “should have a certain length […] such as can readily 
be held in memory.”74
In  the  Lakoffian  vocabulary  I  have  cited,  in  short,  what  I’m  looking  for  at 
this magnitude are perceptual means of “turning systemic causation into direct 
causation.”75 On the level of ‘plot,’ first, we seem quite as capable of empathiz-
ing with the most abstract of representations as we are with human protagonists 
competing for our support: imagine if one line could depict action as first ‘rising’ 
and then ‘falling’? Visualizing what cannot be perceived directly, even blunt sta-
tistics do  indeed perform,  in accordance with the “sufficient  limit” of magnitude 
that Aristotle located in the “change from good fortune to bad fortune” or vice ver-
sa.76 The principle extends from the expanding lists and maps of renewed climate 
commitment, in June 2017 – the Paris Accord being reaffirmed by a number of 
cities, states, and corporations within days of Trump’s withdrawal – to the Anthro-
pocene graphs of the Great Acceleration ‘hockey sticks,’ or the various ‘planetary 
boundaries’ we are in danger of exceeding. On the grandest scenographic mag-
nitude, a similar affective reduction plays into iconic satellite images of the Earth, 
such as the 1972 ‘blue marble’ or the 1990 ‘pale blue dot’: in Turner’s somewhat 
optimistic view, it is by perceptually blending Earth magnitude with our “everyday 
field of vision,” local to us and subject to our actions, that such images may acti-
vate a sense of “human-scale power, responsibility, and duty.”77
Altogether, this sense of human scale coincides with “the sign, scene, or dra-
ma levels” at which “spectators consciously receive performances” according to 
Schechner.78 Perhaps, as I have argued elsewhere,79 the ‘theatricality’ of this 
magnitude is largely about collapsing into synoptic space what otherwise only 
unfolds over longer swathes of time? If performative becoming tends to evade 
consciousness – the Anthropocene as its most extreme example – then theatrical 
appearance is intuited precisely as such and may indeed heighten our sensitivity 
to its performative constitution. Perhaps, seeing all the world as a stage – and so 
as amenable to meaningful human intervention – indeed depends on a theatrical 
inversion of its lines of becoming?
(3) Or then, perhaps not. For all the affective power of theatrical perception, it 
depends on painstaking work behind the scenes, as it were, any sense of human-
scale efficacy owing to more systemic realities that must remain concealed for 
74 Cited in Belfiore 2001, 48; her essay is specifically on Aristotle’s concept of magnitude.
75 Lakoff 2008, 188–9.
76 Cited in Belfiore 2001, 48–9.
77 Turner 2014, 181–2.
78 Schechner 2003, 325.
79 Paavolainen 2018.
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performative effect – these extend from the enabling but invisible work of bacteria 
and internal organs, through any supporting social structures, to capitalist indi-
vidualism’s constitutive otherness of abysmal global inequalities and irreversible 
ecological degradation.80 Contrasting “the weirdly small, fragile blue marble Earth 
pictures” just discussed with “all the little things squiggling around on its crust,” 
Timothy Morton’s striking conclusion is that “the whole is less than the sum of 
its parts, because the whole is one, and the parts are many.” If we consider “the 
good of the whole” as more important and thus more real, “we can ignore extinc-
tion” – by contrast, ecological awareness demands that we “think outside the 
Neolithic box […] on more than one scale at once.”81
In other words, again, mere representation will  not  suffice – not  in graphs, 
brains, streets, or parliaments – without a long-term performative basis in sys-
temic reiteration. In Lakoff’s terms, where Trump’s Strict Father version of di-
rect  action  reflects  the  “natural”  self-interest  of  neoliberal  rationality,  the more 
systemic metaphor of the Nurturant Parent is not about essentializing altruism 
instead, but of developing frames of empathy and nurturance “over a period of 
time and a range of situations.”82 For Klein, we do need to say NO to the world 
that Trump most visibly represents, but we also need “a clear and captivating 
vision of the world beyond that no” – that is, “to build the yes that is the world 
we want and need,” and to perform that world in “solidarity across divisions of 
race, gender, and sexual identity.”83 In her scenario, climate change can only be 
tackled through a “convergence of diverse constituencies on a scale previously 
unknown,” but it may also provide the “overarching narrative” or “catalyzing force” 
for those “seemingly disparate struggles” to actually converge.84
Altogether, if the effects of the Anthropocene even partially reflect such pro-
cesses of ‘plural performativity’ as I have proposed – practices of widespread 
reiteration that are regularly confused with essential nature and thus concealed – 
then any adequate response must be at least equally wide-ranging. Apart from 
disclosing what  has  been  concealed  and  for whose  benefit, we must  seek  to 
instil new values and narratives for ‘theatrical’ perception, and also to embody 
these in recursive, systemic action. On an optimistic note, affirmative clues are 
already becoming visible at both ends of the spectrum. At the ‘normative’ level of 
direct perception, Klein suggests we may one day even come to “thank Trump” 
for how “the shamelessness of his corporate coup” has made “systemic change 
seem more necessary” than ever. At the more systemic level of everyday action, 
likewise, she observes that whole sectors of the economy are indeed “already 
80 Cf. Robbins 2014; on the constitutive ‘outside’ see e.g. Butler 1993, 16, 95.
81 Morton 2018, 94, 99–103; last quote from Morton 2016, 40.
82 E.g. Lakoff 2008, 209–21; 2006, 120–1. On altruism, see Monbiot 2017, 14–26.
83 Klein 2017, 220, 230, 253.
84 Klein 2014, 459, 154, 7, 61.
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low-carbon: caregiving, teaching, social work, the arts.”85 In Butler’s terms, for 
the current norms of global capitalism to appear effective and hegemonic, they 
must “conceal or dissimulate” not only their performative historicity but the fact 
that there are alternatives: from another perspective, indeed, ours is already a 
world of ‘diverse economies,’ and ‘other worlds’ are actively being performed as 
we speak.86
In any case, the slow violence of the Anthropocene is itself becoming exceed-
ingly fast and visible, hence more immune to denial and less in need of transla-
tion. At the time of writing, I refer to the exceptional heat waves of summer 2018, 
hitting no distant peripheries but some ‘core’ regions of the world economy as 
well. With no rain for months on end, the range of responses in the Nordic and 
Baltic countries alone varied from the systemic – farmers putting down cattle for 
the sheer lack of fodder – to the direct, every day, ubiquitous: boosting one’s air 
conditioning (hydrofluorocarbons), preferably with one’s car engine idling (hence 
fuel consumption and carbon dioxide). The cumulative reiteration of such scenes 
epitomizes the Monty Python boot of global warming, making itself felt in the 
present participle: a creeping alienation of what we thought was ‘natural,’ the ul-
timate Verfremdung slowly taking its effekt, in any case for the next several hun-
dred years. At the same time, it is only through a cumulative change in “human 
values, equity, behavior, institutions, economies, and technologies” that we might 
evade the irreversible  trajectory toward what  the  latest scientific Anthropocene 
report of August 2018 dubs, for direct perception, “Hothouse Earth.”87
85 Klein 2017, 262, 270.
86 Butler 1993, 12; Gibson-Graham 2008.
87 Steffen et al. 2018. Such is also the gist of the October 2018 Special Report on Global 
Warming, in which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change urges governments 
to opt for 1.5°C of warming from pre-industrial levels, instead of the maximum 2 degrees 
of the Paris Accord. In their environmental impact statement of August 2018, by compari-
son, the Trump administration itself predicts a four-degree rise by the end of the century, 
but as a matter of course, not as something to be done anything about.
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